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________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
Jose Cristobal Cardona, a federal inmate, petitions 
for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that the 
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) illegally referred him to the 
Special Management Unit (“SMU”) of the penitentiary in 
which he is currently placed, as punishment for filing 
numerous lawsuits against the BOP.  The sole issue 
raised in this appeal is whether Cardona may maintain 
this suit as a habeas action under § 2241, or whether he 
must instead file a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to seek 
redress.  The District Court dismissed Cardona‟s petition 
for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Cardona‟s claims 
were not properly brought under § 2241.  We agree, and 
will affirm. 
I. 
On March 28, 2002, Cardona was convicted by a 
jury in the District of Minnesota of one count of 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over 100 
kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) & 846; one count of conspiring to 
possess with intent to distribute less than 100 grams of 
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heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) 
& 846; one count of possession with intent to distribute 
over 100 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B); and one count of 
possession with intent to distribute over 100 grams of 
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 
(b)(1)(C).  Cardona was sentenced, inter alia, to 480-
months imprisonment.   
Since being sentenced, Cardona has been 
transferred between several federal correctional facilities.  
At some time prior to February 27, 2009, Cardona was 
transferred to the United States Penitentiary in 
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, where he remains.  On that 
date, BOP served Cardona with a notice that he was 
being referred to the SMU.  The SMU provides a four-
step program that limits an inmate‟s contact with other 
prisoners and limits access to the inmate‟s own personal 
property.  An inmate referred to the SMU is gradually 
allowed to reintegrate, so long as he or she demonstrates 
“the potential for positive „community‟ interaction.”  
App‟x JA031.  Section 5217.01 of BOP‟s Program 
Statement (the “Program Statement”), see App‟x JA023-
34, provides that referral to the SMU is “non-punitive” 
and is appropriate, inter alia, when an inmate has a 
history of serious disciplinary infractions. 
Between Cardona‟s sentencing and his referral to 
the SMU, Cardona filed more than seven lawsuits 
challenging various aspects of his conviction and the 
 5 
 
conditions of his confinement.  Cardona considers 
himself “a natural born Mexican American freedom 
fighter [who] files lawsuits against [BOP] officials and 
fights for the freedom of unlawful convictions and 
injustices by the U.S. government‟s corrupt officials 
against the Mexican people.”  App‟x JA017.  Cardona 
believes that his referral to the SMU was an attempt to 
punish him for his history of litigation.
1
   
On December 28, 2010, Cardona filed a pro se 
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, contesting his 
referral to the SMU.  Cardona argued that his referral to 
the SMU was punitive, and was thus “illegal” under the 
Program Statement.
2
  On January 24, 2011, the District 
Court dismissed Cardona‟s petition for lack of 
jurisdiction.  The Court held that Cardona‟s placement in 
the SMU did not “affect the fact or duration” of his 
incarceration, and that his claim therefore did not lie in 
                                                 
1
 Cardona concedes that BOP‟s notice stated that his 
referral was the result of various narcotics-related 
infractions.  App‟x JA017.  Cardona argues that he has 
been “free from incident reports” since June 3, 2008, 
implying that BOP‟s justification was pretextual. 
 
2
 Cardona also raised claims under the Administrative 
Procedures Act.  Those claims have not been raised on 
appeal, and we do not address them here. 
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habeas.  App‟x JA011.  The Court dismissed Cardona‟s 
petition without prejudice to file a civil rights action 
raising the same allegations under Bivens.  On January 
28, 2011, Cardona timely filed a pro se motion for 
reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
59(e).  On May 16, 2011, the District Court denied 
Cardona‟s motion. 
 On May 20, 2011, Cardona timely filed a pro se 
notice of appeal.  On July 14, 2011, we appointed pro 
bono counsel.
3
  We directed counsel to address “along 
with any other issues, whether Appellant‟s claims may be 
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”  App‟x JA013. 
II. 
Cardona raises a single, discrete issue on appeal:  
whether the District Court erred by dismissing his 
petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 & 2253(a).  We review de novo the District 
Court‟s dismissal of a habeas petition on jurisdictional 
grounds.  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 119 
(3d Cir. 2002). 
                                                 
3
 We express our appreciation to pro bono counsel, 
Adrian N. Roe, law student David M. McCleary, and the 
Duquesne University School of Law Bill of Rights 
Clinic, for their able representation of Cardona in this 
matter. 
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 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.  
They possess only that power authorized by Constitution 
and statute[.]”  Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).  Two federal statutes, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2241 & 2255, confer federal jurisdiction over 
habeas petitions filed by federal inmates.  The exact 
interplay between § 2241 and § 2255 is complicated, and 
explication of that relationship is unnecessary for 
resolution of this appeal.  See generally In re Dorsainvil, 
119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997).  What is relevant for 
our purposes is that unlike § 2255, which only confers 
jurisdiction over “challenges [to] the validity of the 
petitioner‟s sentence[,]” we have held that § 2241 
“confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a 
federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but 
the execution of his sentence.”4  Woodall v. Fed. Bureau 
                                                 
4
 Cardona argues that the District Court erred by holding 
that “[f]ederal habeas relief is unavailable unless the 
petition attacks „the validity of the continued conviction 
or the fact or length of the sentence.‟”  App‟x JA011.  
We agree, insofar as the District Court failed to recognize 
that § 2241 extends jurisdiction to claims concerning the 
execution of a federal inmate‟s sentence.  See Woodall v. 
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241-42 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Nonetheless, “[w]e may affirm a district court for 
any reason supported by the record.”  Brightwell v. 
Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001)).
5
 
 Admittedly, “the precise meaning of „execution of 
the sentence‟ is hazy.”  Woodall, 432 F.3d at 242.  We 
considered this issue in detail in Woodall.  There, the 
sentencing court specifically included in its sentencing 
judgment a recommendation that the petitioner “spend 
the last six months of his sentence in a halfway house[,]” 
in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).  Woodall, 432 
F.3d at 238.  Despite this recommendation, BOP refused 
to place Woodall in a Community Corrections Center 
                                                 
5
 Other Courts of Appeals have also held that § 2241 
permits challenges to the execution of an inmate‟s 
sentence.  See, e.g., Gonzales-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 
F.3d 864, 875 n.9 (1st Cir. 2010); Nichols v. Symmes, 
553 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 2009); Antonelli v. Warden, 
U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008); 
Adams v. United States, 372 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 
2004); United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th 
Cir. 2001); Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 
(9th Cir. 2000); Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 
694 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.5 
(4th Cir. 1997). 
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(“CCC”)6 for more than ten weeks, citing its own internal 
regulations.  Woodall filed a habeas petition under 
§ 2241, challenging BOP‟s decision to limit his 
placement in a CCC to ten weeks. 
We held that Woodall‟s claim concerned the 
execution of his sentence, and was properly brought 
under § 2241.  We defined execution as meaning “to „put 
into effect‟ or „carry out.‟”  Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243 
(quoting Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 794 
(1993)).  Woodall was challenging the inconsistency 
between the sentencing court‟s recommendation and 
BOP‟s refusal to abide by that recommendation.  As we 
noted, “[c]arrying out a sentence through detention in a 
CCC is very different from carrying out a sentence in an 
ordinary penal institution.”  Id.  Because Woodall‟s 
habeas petition claimed that BOP was not “carrying out” 
his sentence as directed, we held that his petition was 
reviewable under § 2241. 
Similarly, in McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 
936-37 (3d Cir. 2010), the petitioner was sentenced to 
120-months imprisonment and assessed a $10,000 fine.  
The sentencing judgment provided that while the 
petitioner was in prison, “[p]ayment [of the fine] is to be 
made from prison earnings at a rate of $20.00 per 
                                                 
6
 We noted that a CCC was for all intents and purposes 
indistinguishable from a halfway house.  See Woodall, 
432 F.3d at 240 n.4. 
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month[.]”  Id. at 934.   Despite this specified rate of 
repayment in McGee‟s sentencing judgment, BOP placed 
McGee on an Inmate Financial Responsibility Plan 
(“IFRP”) that required McGee to make payments at a rate 
of $25 per month.  McGee filed a habeas petition under 
§ 2241, challenging BOP‟s decision to increase the rate 
of repayment in his IFRP beyond the rate provided for by 
the sentencing court. 
Again, we held that McGee‟s claim concerned the 
execution of his sentence, and was properly brought 
under § 2241.  In so holding, we emphasized the fact that 
McGee‟s petition was “at bottom, a challenge to the 
IFRP and its requirement that McGee pay [$25 per 
month] when his sentence . . . requires only $20 per 
month[.]”  Id. at 937.  Indeed, we characterized McGee‟s 
petition as “argu[ing] that the payment terms imposed by 
[BOP] (in the IFRP) are illegal in that they conflict with 
the terms imposed by the sentencing court (in the 
judgment).”  Id.   
The petitions in Woodall and McGee both 
challenged BOP conduct that conflicted with express 
statements in the applicable sentencing judgment.  That 
is, both petitions claimed that the BOP was not properly 
“„put[ting] into effect‟ or „carry[ing] out‟” the directives 
of the sentencing judgment.  Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243; 
see also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754-55 
(2004) (holding that an inmate‟s civil rights claim could 
not “be construed as seeking a judgment at odds with his 
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conviction or with the State‟s calculation of time to be 
served in accordance with the underlying sentence[,]” 
and thus “raised no claim on which habeas relief could 
have been granted on any recognized theory”).  For that 
reason, we held that Woodall and McGee‟s petitions 
concerned the execution of their sentences, and that 
§ 2241 authorized a federal district court to exercise 
jurisdiction over both petitions. 
In order to challenge the execution of his sentence 
under § 2241, Cardona would need to allege that BOP‟s 
conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or 
recommendation in the sentencing judgment.
7
   Cardona 
has failed to do so here.  He has not alleged that BOP‟s 
conduct was inconsistent with any express command or 
recommendation in his sentencing judgment.  Indeed, at 
oral argument, Cardona conceded that there was nothing 
in the judgment forbidding, or even concerning, his 
placement in the SMU.  Cardona‟s petition simply does 
not concern how BOP is “carrying out” or “putting into 
effect” his sentence, as directed in his sentencing 
judgment.  Consequently, Cardona has not challenged the 
                                                 
7
 We do not suggest that contesting any express 
recommendation from the sentencing court will 
necessarily give rise to habeas jurisdiction under § 2241.  
There may be circumstances where an alleged 
discrepancy between a court‟s recommendation and the 
BOP‟s conduct do not give rise to a habeas claim.  
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execution of his sentence, such that the District Court 
would have jurisdiction over his petition under § 2241. 
Cardona alternatively argues that his claim is a 
challenge to the length of his confinement, and therefore 
may be brought in a habeas petition.  He argues that as a 
consequence of his referral to the SMU, he becomes 
eligible to lose “good time credits” that might have 
resulted in a lower sentence.  We considered this 
argument in detail in Leamer, where a New Jersey inmate 
challenged his placement in a Restricted Activities 
Program, which consequently made him ineligible for 
parole.  Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 536 (3d Cir. 
2002).  There, we held that such a claim was not properly 
brought in habeas because “a favorable decision of 
Leamer‟s challenge would [not] necessarily imply that he 
would serve a shorter sentence[.]”  Id. at 543.  That is, 
even if Leamer was removed from the Restricted 
Activities Program and became eligible for parole, he 
might not necessarily receive a shorter sentence.  The 
facts here are virtually indistinguishable from Leamer.  
Even if Cardona‟s placement in the SMU makes him 
eligible to lose good time credits, he might not end up 
losing any.
8
   
                                                 
8
 Indeed, the Supreme Court‟s recent opinion in Pepper 
v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011) calls 
into question whether an inmate can even bring a habeas 
claim for an actual loss of good time credits, holding that 
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Cardona‟s claims do not concern the execution of 
his sentence, because the BOP‟s conduct is not 
inconsistent with his sentencing judgment.  Cardona‟s 
claims also would not necessarily result in a change to 
the duration of his sentence.  Thus, “granting [Cardona‟s] 
petition would [not] „necessarily imply‟ a change to 
the . . . duration, or execution of the petitioner‟s 
sentence.”  McGee, 627 F.3d at 936.  As such, Cardona‟s 
claims were not properly brought in a habeas petition 
under § 2241, and the District Court correctly dismissed 
his petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
9
 
                                                                                                             
“[a]n award of good time credit by the [BOP] does not 
affect the length of a court-imposed sentence; rather, it is 
an administrative reward „to provide an incentive for 
prisoners to compl[y] with institutional disciplinary 
regulations.‟”  Id. at 1248 n.14 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. ---, 130 S. 
Ct. 2499, 2505 (2010)). 
 
9
 We have held that a challenge to the conditions of an 
inmate‟s confinement may be brought in a civil rights 
action.  See McGee, 627 F.3d at 936 (discussing Leamer).  
The Government suggests that because Cardona‟s 
petition concerns the conditions of his confinement, and 
thus would properly be brought in a civil rights action, 
that he cannot raise these same claims in a habeas 
petition.  Because we determine that Cardona‟s claim 
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III. 
 
We conclude that Cardona‟s claims were not 
properly brought in a habeas petition under § 2241, and 
as such, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over 
his petition.  We will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
 
   
                                                                                                             
does not concern the execution of his sentence, it is 
irrelevant whether or not his claims concern the 
conditions of his sentence; we express no opinion on 
whether Cardona could bring his claims in a civil rights 
action under Bivens.   
